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NOTE
Private Actions by Foreign Governments
Under U.S. Antitrust Laws
Pfizer v. Government of India, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978)
India, Iran, and the Phillippines' brought independent civil actions for
treble damages under the Clayton Act2 against six American pharmaceutical
companies.3 The foreign governments alleged the existence of a conspiracy
among the drug companies to restrain and monopolize interstate and
foreign trade in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of broad spectrum
antibiotics 4 in violation of the Sherman Act.' The defendant companies
asserted the affirmative defense that foreign governments were not "per-
sons" entitled to sue under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,6 as defined by both
the Sherman and Clayton Acts.' In response to defendants' pretrial motions
to dismiss and a counter-motion by the plaintiffs to strike the affirmative
defense, the district court held that the foreign governments were in fact
"persons" entitled to sue and denied defendants' motions to dismiss the
complaints. The district court then certified this question for interlocutory
appeal.' The original three judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
I. A fourth respondent's complaint, the Republic of Vietnam's, was dismissed by the dis-
trict court subsequent to petitioners' filing for certiorari, but prior to the Supreme Court's
granting of the writ. The dismissal was based upon the ground that the United States no longer
recognized the government of Vietnam, and was affirmed by the circuit court. Republic of Viet-
nam v. Pfizer, 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides that:
Any persons who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold damages by
him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
3. Pfizer, Inc., American Cyanamid Company, Bristol-Meyers Company, Squibb Cor-
poration, Olin Corporation and The Upjohn Company.
4. The objectionable activities allegedly practiced by the companies included price fixing,
market division, and fraud upon the United States Patent Office.
5. Sherman Act§§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ , 2 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in
appropriate part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal .. "
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in appropriate part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
6. See note 2supra.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); 15 U.S.C. 12 (1976). Both the Sherman and Clayton Acts provide
that the word "person" "shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing un-
der or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the
laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country."
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
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peals' and the entire circuit in a later en banc rehearing,'" affirmed the dis-
trict court's rulings. Upon writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States" held, affirmed. Foreign nations are "persons" under Section
4 of the Clayton Act and, therefore, are entitled to sue for treble damages.
Pfizer v. Government of India, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. General Right of Foreign Sovereign to Sue in United States Courts
Accessibility to U.S. courts by foreign nations for civil litigation is well
established. 2 The Constitution's extension of judicial power "to all Cases,
in Law and Equity arising . . . between a State or Citizen thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects,"' 3 in conjunction with the Con-
gressional grant of original jurisdiction to federal courts over controversies
between "a foreign state ... as plaintiff, and citizens of a State or of dif-
ferent States,"' 4 provide the legal base upon which such access to U.S.
courts derives. In addition, principles of comity" among sovereign states
support, but do not require this access.' 6 This limit to the influence of such
principles of comity results from a recognition of the fact that foreign access
to U.S. courts is a matter of national policy transcending the interests of the
parties to the action."
Resolution of the question of which foreign sovereigns will be allowed
to sustain actions in U.S. courts has been left to the executive and legislative
9. Pfizer v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976).
10. Pfizer v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
11. Justice Blackmun not participating.
12. The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870), was the first United States Supreme
Court decision which dealt with the issue of whether a foreign sovereign might sue in civil ac-
tion in a United States court. The case involved a collision between the French ship Euryale,
owned by the Emperor Napoleon I1l, and the American ship Sapphire in San Francisco har-
bor. The representative of the Emperor filed a libel against the American vessel two days after
the collision in federal district court- In addressing the issue of whether a civil suit could be
sustained by a foreign government the court noted that the Constitution had expressly extended
the judicial powers of the court to controversies "between a State, Citizen thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects." (U.S. Const. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 1). In addition, the Court noted that
to deny such a right of action "would manifest a want of comity and friendly feelings." The
Sapphire, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) at 167. Consequently, the Court held that a United States court
may entertain civil suits by foreign sovereign plaintiffs.
For an earlier circuit court decision which expressed a rationale similar to the one ex-
pressed in The Sapphire, see King of Spain v. Oliver, 14 F. Cas. 577 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No.
7814).
13. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1977).
15. Comity, as defined by Webster, "is in general terms that there are between nations at
peace with one another rights both national and individual resulting from country or courtesy
due one friendly nation to another. Among these is the right to sue in their courts respectively."
6 Webster Works, 117 quoted in Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235
N.Y. 255, 258, 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923); Disconto Gesellschaft v. Terlinden. 127 Wis. 651, 660,
106 N.W. 821, 823 (1906).
16. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
17. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408 (1964).
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departments of government.'" The avoidance of judicial involvement in
these determinations results from a recognition of the Constitution's general
grant of power over foreign relations to these other departments of govern-
ment." In addition, judicial deference recognizes the politically sensitive
nature of these decisions and the need to avoid embarrassing contradictions
in the handling of the extension or withdrawal of this right to sue.20 The
medium for access to the courts has been executive recognition of a plaintiff
government." Once recognized, accessibility will be denied only during
war;22 mere severance of diplomatic realtions, establishment of commercial
embargoes, or the freezing of a foreign government's assets in this country is
insufficient to preclude such access, 3 Parenthetically, it should be noted
that once a foreign sovereign avails itself of this right to sue, it abandons its
18. Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Russia, 21 F.2d 396. 399-400(2dCir. 1927)- See Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1890).
19. Lehigh Valley R.R., 21 F.2d at 399-400.
20. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 931-32.
21. Cf. The Penza, 277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1921); Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic, supra note 15.
22. Ex pare Colonna, 314 U.S. 510 (1942). In this case, the Royal Italian Ambassador
filed a petition in the United States District Court seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus
against the seizure of one of the Italian Government's oil-ladened vessels. The ambassador's
defense consisted of the affirmative defense of a foreign government's sovereign immunity from
suit- Subsequent to the bringing of the action war was declared between the United States and
Italy- The Court citing the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 411, and a number of
cases which recognized the principle that war suspends the right of enemy plaintiffs to
prosecute actions in our courts, dismissed the Ambassador's petition. The Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. § 7 (b) (1970) provides:
Nothing in this Act [sections 1-6, 7-39 and 41-44 of this Appendix[ shall be deemed
to authorize the prosecution of any suit or action at law or in equity in any court
within the United States by an enemy or ally of enemy prior to the end of the war, ex-
cept as provided in section ten hereof [section 10 of this Appendix]: Provided
however, That an enemy or ally of enemy licensed to do business under this Act [sec-
tions 1-6, 7-39 and 41-44 of this Appendix] may prosecute and maintain any such
suit or action so far as the same arises solely out of the business transacted within the
United States under such license and so long as such license remains in full force and
effect: And provided further. That an enemy or ally of enemy may defend by counsel
any suit in equity or action at law which may be brought against him.
23. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 17, at 931. The Court offered the
following rationale for its refusal to adopt the defendant's assertion that Cuba as an unfriendly
power should be denied access to United States courts:
This Court would hardly be competent to undertake assessments of varying degrees
of friendliness or its absence, and, lacking some definite touchstone for determina-
tion, we are constrained to consider any relationship, short of war, with a recognized
sovereign power as embracing the privilege of resorting to United States courts.
Although the severance of diplomatic relations is an overt act with objective
significance in the dealings of sovereign states, we are unwilling to say that it should
inevitably result in the withdrawal of the privilege of bringing suit. Severance may
take place for any number of political reasons, its duration is unpredictable, and
whatever expression of animostiy it may imply does not approach that implicit in a
declaration of war.
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sovereign immunity and is subjected to the procedures and rules of decision
governing the local forum.24
II. THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS'
TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY
Although the above explanation indicates that U.S. courts are generally
available for redress of foreign sovereigns' civil grievances, whether those
sovereigns will be afforded a right of action for antitrust treble damages
"turns on ... interpretation of the statute," 5 which grants the right of ac-
tion. The Clayton Act grants a right of action for treble damages to "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust law ... "26 "Person," as defined by the
statutes, includes "corporations and associations.., authorized by the laws
of either the United States . . . (its) territories .... (or) any State, or (by) the
laws of any foreign country."27 Despite the fact that the Sherman Act, since
its inception in 1890, and the Clayton Act, since its inception in 1915, have
allowed treble damage relief, the court had never before been confronted
with the question of construing these words vis-6-vis a foreign sovereign.2"
Some direction is offered, however, by previous constructions of these
provisions with relation to the federal government and to the several states.
24. In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 135 (1938), the
court held that barring some persuasive demand of public policy, principles of justice require
that a state statute of limitation be applied to a foreign sovereign plaintiff.
In Republic of Honduras v. Soto, 112 N.Y. 310, 19 N.E. 845 (1889), the New York Court
of Appeals construed section 3276 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure, requiring plain-
tiffs ("persons") residing outside the state to post security for court costs, to include foreign
sovereign plaintiffs.
The recently enacted Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 allows a defendant to
assert a counterclaim against a foreign sovereign plaintiff if the counterclaim arises out of the
same transaction as the foreign plaintiff's claim (28 U.S.C. § 1607 (b) (1977)) or if the extent of
"the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that
sought by the foreign state." (28 U.S.C.A. § 1607 (c) West 1978). This latter right of counter-
claim (§ 1607(c)) was included to prevent a foreign state from asserting a sovereign immunity
defense from situations involving a set off. H.R. Rep No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., (1976)
reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6622. See First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
25. 98 S.Ct. at 587, quoting the circuit court, 550 F.2d at 397. Parenthetically it should be
noted that foreign sovereigns were at the time of the passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
permitted to maintain actions for common-law business torts. See, e.g- French Republic v.
Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 194 F.
500 (S.D.N.Y. 1894).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15. See note 2 supra.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 12. See note 7 supra.
28. The Court of Appeals noted that "all parties agree this is a case of first impression."
Pfizer v. Government of India, 550 F.2d at 397.
The Southern District of New York had faced this question in a related action involving
the same defendants, resolving the issue in favor of the plaintiff government, Kuwait. In re An-
tibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). An appeal was taken from this
decision but was later dismissed by stipulation of the parties, see 98 S. Ct. at 586, n. 5.
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A. Unavailability of the Treble Damage Remedy to the United States
In United States v. Cooper,2 9 the Treasury Department brought a civil
action for treble damages against eighteen named defendants who, in
response to a government solicitation of bids for intended tire purchases,
had submitted four sets of identical bids. The Treasury Department's com-
plaint charged collusion and prayed for treble damage relief for the injuries
sustained when the Department was forced to purchase the tires under such
unfavorable circumstances. The defendants' answer raised the affirmative
defense that the United States was not a "person" entitled to sue for treble
damages under Section 7 of the Sherman Act.30 The Supreme Court upheld
the defendants' affirmative defense.
In an exhaustive legislative and judicial analysis of the Sherman Act,
Justice Roberts' majority opinion offered several rationales for the court's
conclusion. The opinion first noted that if the United States was to have
been included in the statute's use of the words "any person," which would
secure a right of action for the United States, then the United States would
also have to have been included in the same statute's use of the word "per-
son" in the phrase "injured... by any other person or corporation." Such a
reading, the Court reasoned, would not only entitle the United States to sue
for treble damages but would also make the United States liable to suit for
treble damages.3 The Court, therefore, concluded that the statute's use of
the word "any person" was insufficient to authorize a governmental right of
action.32
Second, the Court discussed the legislative scheme envisioned by the
Sherman Act. It noted that the Act envisaged two classes of action: those
made available only to the Government, viz. criminal prosecution,33 in-
junctive relief,14 and seizures of property,3" and that made available to
29. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
30. Prior to 1955, two sources of the treble damage remedy were available to plaintiffs in-
jured by the anticompetitive activities of others, viz. Section 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7,
26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (repealed 1955) and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
The enactment of Section 4 of the Clayton Act in 1914 was in part a recognition by the Con-
gress that Section 7 of the Sherman Act had not successfully stimulated private litigation for the
enforcement of the Sherman Act. S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1955) reprinted in
[1955] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2328, 2329. Section 7 in the Sherman Act differs from Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act in that the former statute includes the following phrase "by any other
person or corporation."
Compare Section 7 of the Sherman Act which reads in its entirety:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act,
may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
(emphasis supplied) with Section 4 of the Clayton Act, note 2, supra.
31. Cooper v. United States, 312 U.S. at 606.
32. Id.
33. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1976).
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redress private injury, viz. the treble damage remedy.36 The Court reasoned
that since Congress had not seen fit to provide injunctive relief to private
parties, the Court had not done so in its prior opinions." Conversely, the
Court reasoned that it could not now extend a right of action for treble
damage relief, a private remedy, to the United States.38 Third, the Court
noted that previous judicial expressions,3" the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act,40 and the fact that prior to this suit, the United States had not
sought treble damages since the inception of the Sherman Act fifty years
earlier,4' led the Court to conclude that the treble damage remedy was an ex-
clusively private remedy. Upon these grounds, the Court held that the
United States was not a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages.
Justice Black, in a forceful dissent joined by Justices Reed and Douglas,
countered the majority's opinion by arguing that Congress intended "to give
equal protection to all persons similarly injured." 2 He stated that nothing
short of "clear and unequivocal statutory language" could exclude any
single purchaser.4 3 Futhermore, he noted that even the familiar canons of
statutory construction" support a U.S. right of action for treble damages. A
denial of a right of action for treble damages to the largest single purchaser
would restrict "the remedy in such a way ... [as to make] the evil aimed at
less likely to be suppressed." 4
To the degree that the majority's opinion in Cooper is based on the
added language of Section 7 of the Sherman Act 4 6 rather than the language
of Section 4 of the Clayton Act,47 the Court's opinion is of little analytic
value because Section 7 of the Sherman Act has since been repealed.48 To
the extent, however, that the opinion is based upon the Court's analysis of
the legislative scheme envisioned by the Sherman Act, the opinion offers an
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 71 (1903); Paine Lumber
Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1916).
The Cooper Court noted however that the Sherman Act had been amended in 1914 to
authorize suits for private injunction (see Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. 26 (1976)). Cooper v.
United States, 312 U.S. at 608, n. 9.
38. Cooper v. United States, 312 U.S. at 608.
39. See cases cited in 312 U.S. at 610, n. 14.
40. The Court noted that the initial bill proposed by Senator Sherman included a govern-
ment right to single damages in Section I of the bill and a private right to double damages in
Section 2, When Senator Hoar rewrote the bill before its final presentation to the Congress he
eliminated Section l's grant of a right to single damages and substituted a number of other civil
and criminal remedies. He also increased Section 2's grant of double damages to treble
damages. See Cooper v. United States, 312 U.S. at 611-12.
41. 312 U.S. at 613-14.
42. Id. at 615.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 617 which states: "For it is a primary principle that a law should be construed so
as to carryout its purpose, in light of the evil aimed at and the protection intended to be
afforded."
45. Id.
46. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
47. See note 2 supra.
48. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-137. ch. 283, § 3, 69. Stat. 283.
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opportunity for analytical comment. The Court held that the legislative
scheme of the Sherman Act envisioned two mutually exclusive sets of
remedies, the governmental remedies and the private treble damage remedy.
In addition, prior cases have indicated that the treble damage remedy en-
compasses two purposes: (a) To compensate victims of antitrust violations
and (b) to act as a deterrent to anticompetitive behavior." Another objec-
tive of the treble damage remedy is the encouragement of the private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws.50 Inasmuch as the purposes of the treble
damage remedy are to compensate victims and deter violations, the Court's
decision in Cooper to withhold a right of action for treble damages for the
United States, serves to thwart these purposes, particularly in light of the
fact that the U.S. Government is the single largest consumer.5" However.
since the treble damage remedy is used to encourage private action, the ad-
ded incentive of receiving three times the actual damages to a government
that should already be vigilant, is legislative overkill. As a result, it is no
wonder that Congress, in 1955, amended the Sherman Act to give the
United States a right of action for single damages.52
B. Availability of the Treble Damage Remedy to the States
The Court expanded the notion of governmental standing to sue for
treble damages in Georgia v. Evans,53 decided only one term after Cooper.
The State of Georgia, through its attorney general, brought an action
against respondent asphalt manufacturers seeking treble damage relief for
injuries sustained when the respondents allegedly combined to fix prices and
suppress competition. The respondents, citing Cooper, asserted the affirm-
ative defense that the states were not "persons" entitled to sue for treble
49, See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
50. Id.
51. See Justice Black's dissent in Cooper, 312 U.S. at 615-16, n. I.
52. Act of July 7, 1955, § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1970). But see Langsdorf. TheUnited States
as Antitrust Damage Plaintiff: Mistreated Stepchild of the Parents Patriae, 16 Antitrust Bull.
187 (1971), in which the author discusses judicially created limitations indirectly affecting the
Government's ability to assert its right to single damage relief. These limitations were enun-
ciated in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (DR.I. 1964), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The limitations include: (1) The fact that the Government must
bring its action for damages within four years after the cause of action accrues and is not en-
titled to wait until one year after the conclusion of the enforcement action as other plaintiffs
are, and (2) the fact that the Government may not assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel once
an enforcement action has found a defendant to have violated the Act.
However, in one interesting case a district court has allowed a governmental corporation
to assert an action for treble damages. In United States v. General Electric Co., 209 F_ Supp.
197 (E.D.Pa. 1962), the court held that the Tennessee Valley Authority, as a wholly owned cor-
poration of the United States Government, was entitled to sue for treble damages, since Section
I of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12, defines "person" to include inter alia. "corporations and
associations existing under or authorized by the laws of . the United States . . ." Further-
more, the court noted that "the form in which Congress created TVA was not the result of for-
tuitous or capricious circumstance. The very reason for the utilization of the corporate form
was to free the agency from the inadequacies and restraints of the controversial executive
agency." 209 F_ Supp. at 204.
53. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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damages under Section 7 of the Sherman Act.5" The Court held that the
States were persons entitled to sue for treble damage relief.55
The Court reached its decision using the following analysis. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, quoted Cooper. noting that "there is
no hard and fast rule of exclusion." 56 The Court stated that there was no
reason to believe that Congress had wanted to deprive the states of the treble
damage remedy.57 The opinion pointed to the fact that the Court had
previously held that a municipality, a subdivision of the state, is entitled to
sue for treble damages.5" It reiterated its finding that the legislative scheme
of the Sherman Act envisaged two classes of action - governmental and
private. The Court reasoned that unlike the situation in Cooper in which
the United States had recourse to a number of remedies, the states are
not afforded any of those remedies by the Sherman Act. 60 If the states were
not allowed a right of action for treble damages, they would be afforded no
remedy at all. 6 ' As a result, the Court held that the states were "persons" en-
titled to sue for treble damage.
Justice Roberts, the lone dissenter in Georgia, reiterated his argument
in Cooper that the language of the statute itself would prevent the Court's
finding a right of action for the states.62
The Court's opinion in Georgia serves both the compensatory and
deterrert purposes of the treble damage remedy.63 The fact that the states
are afforded treble damages, instead of single damages, however, seems an
unnecessary incentive and windfall, considering the general obligation of
government to be vigilant in enforcing its laws. However, since existing
legislation did not then (and does not now) leave the Court with the single
damage option for the states, the treble damage remedy is preferable to no
remedy at all.
III. THE PFIZER OPINION
The suit brought in Pfizer presented the Court with an opportunity to
resolve the last of a series of cases construing the word "persons" in relation
to the treble damage remedy. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
recognized that when Congress had passed the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
it had not considered the question of whether a foreign nation might be en-
titled to sue for treble damages.64 The Court, however, adopting a rationale
similar to the one enunciated by Justice Black's dissent in Cooper, reasoned
that the Sherman Act was designed to be comprehensive in its terms,
54. See discussion in note 30, supra.
55. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. at 162.
56. Id. at 161 quoting Cooper v. United States, 312 U.S. at 604-05.
57. Id at 162.
58. Id.; See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
59. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
60. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. at 162.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 163. See discussion of this argument in text accompanying notes 31 supra-
63. 316 U.S. at 163.
64. 98 S. Ct. at 587.
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protecting all potential victims from the perpetrators of forbidden prac-
tices.6" Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress' use of the phrase
"any person" was intended to have its naturally broad and inclusive mean-
ing. 66
The majority next directed its attention to the respondents' foreign and
sovereign characteristics. With respect to the former, the Court reasoned
that since Congress had granted a right of action for treble damages to
foreign corporations,67 it clearly did not contemplate restricting the remedy
to only the American consumer, although this may have been Congress'
foremost concern.6" With respect to respondents' sovereign characteristics,
the Court adopted a rationale similar to the one it articulated in Georgia.6 9 It
noted that, similar to a state of the Union, a foreign nation is not afforded
the several remedies permitted the United States.70 Consequently, a
denial of the treble damage remedy would present a foreign sovereign no
alternative remedy.7' The majority reiterated the Court's prior finding of
two purposes for the treble damage provision, compensation and
deterrence,7 2 and reasoned that to deny a foreign plaintiff the right to sue for
treble damages would permit a violator to escape full liability for his actions
and result in compensation being denied to certain victims.7" It reasoned
that such exclusion would lessen the deterrent effect of the treble damage
remedy." As a result, the Court concluded that foreign sovereigns should be
included within Section 4 of the Clayton Act's use of the word "person" and
thereby should be permitted to maintain an antitrust action for treble
damages.
Finally, the majority's opinion noted that the decision reached by the
Court did not result in judicial interference in sensitive foreign policy mat-
ters, since the Court's decision limited a foreign sovereign's right to initiate a
treble damage action to the long standing threshold requirements for suit of
a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court. That is, in order for a foreign nation to,
sue, it must be recognized by and be at peace with the United States.7s
Chief Justice Burger, joined in his dissent by Justices Powell and Rehn-
quist, characterized the holding of the majority as an "undisguised exercise
of legislative power ... at odds with the language of the statute (and) with its
legislative history and [the] precedents of this Court."7 6 He reasoned that
statutory construction begins with the language of the statute itself, and the
absence of "foreign sovereigns" from the definition of "person" in light of
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See notes 2 & 7 supra.
68. 98 S. Ct. at 588.
69. See text accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra.
70. 98 S. Ct. at 590.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 588. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 746.
73. 98 S. Ct. at 588.
74. Id at 589.
75. Id. at 591. See text accompanying notes 12-24 supra.
76. 98 S. Ct. at 592.
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the inclusion of an explicit reference to "corporations and associations" ex-
isting under "the laws of any foreign country,"" should be dispositive in
concluding that Congress intended to omit foreign sovereigns from the
benefits of the Act.7" The majority had reasoned that since Congress had
granted a right of action for treble damages to foreign corporations, Con-
gress had not contemplated restricting the remedies of the Sherman Act to
the American consumer."' The Chief Justice responded that, unlike foreign
corporations which must submit to the jurisdiction of the United States
when they enter the American marketplace, foreign sovereigns, at the time
of the passage of the Sherman Act, did not have to do so; the doctrine of
sovereign immunity afforded these nations immunity from suit in U.S.
courts. s0 The dissent also argued that given the majority's admission that
Congress had not considered the question of whether foreign sovereigns
were persons," 8 the legislative history of the treble damages remedy did not
support the proposition of a right of action for treble damages by a foreign
sovereign.82
The dissent then considered the majority's analogy between the states
of the Union and foreign sovereigns.83 The Chief Justice argued that unlike
"our own states, whose freedom of action in this regard is constrained by
the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, foreign sovereigns remain free to
enact and enforce their own comprehensive antitrust statutes and to impose
other more drastic sanctions on offending corporations.""4 In addition, the
dissent pointed to the coercive economic power and political interests which
serve to distinguish domestic states from foreign sovereigns. 5 Concluding
with these points, the Chief Justic noted that the majority's opinion created
an anomaly. He reasoned that while the U.S. Government may not sue for
treble damages, other nations which are free to engage in anticompetitive
77. See notes 2 & 7 supra.
78. 98 S. Ct. at 592.
79. Id. at 588.
80. Id. at 592.
The Chief Justice, recognizing that the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A, §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (West 1978), militates against the asserting of the
sovereign immunity defense by a foreign state (§ 1605(a) (2) specifically preludes the assertion
of the sovereign immunity defense from suit when those suits involve the commercial activities
of a foreign state in or having an affect upon United States), implied that a law enacted in 1976
could not be used to construe a statute enacted in 1890. Consequently, he reasoned it is Con-
gress and not the courts who should take these later developments into account if statutory
reinterpretation is desired.
81. See id. at 587.
82. Id. at 594.
83. In particular, the Chief Justice noted that respondents India and the Philippines as
well as amicus West Germany, had a number of antitrust laws. And in fact West Germany had
already commenced proceedings against petitioner Pfizer under German law for alleged viola-
tions involving the same facts at issue in the noted case.
84. 98 S. Ct. at 595.
85. Id.
The dissent went on to provide a poignant example: "The International price fixing,
boycotts, and other current anti-competitive practices undertaken by some Middle Eastern na-
tions are illustrative of the weapons in the arsonals of foreign nations which no domestic State
could ever employ."
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conduct have the right to sue for treble damages. 6 The dissent then made
one final argument; it asserted that "the treble damage provision . .. is
designed primarily as a remedy." 87 As such, the dissent reasoned that treble
damages should not be invoked to reverse their priority from one of remedy
to that of deterrence. 88
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PFIZER OPINION
Pfizer firmly resolves the last of a series of cases construing "persons"
entitled to sue for treble damages. Its holding is founded on the strong
deterrent value afforded by the treble damage remedy and the remedy's
function of compensating victims. The rationale underlying the majority's
opinion is, however, open to analysis.
First, Justice Stewart's majority opinion reasoned that since foreign
corporations are afforded a right of action for treble damages, the Congress
indicated that it did not intend to restrict the remedy solely to the American
consumer.8 9 Although this reasoning may be correct on its face, it implicitly
exaggerates the degree of concern which the Congress may have had for
foreign entities when the Sherman Act was passed. The mere equitable
recognition by Congress of a right to treble damages by a foreign corpora-
tion subject to our antitrust laws upon its entering the U.S. marketplace,
does not indicate an intent to expand the application of the treble damage
remedy to foreign entities whose own activities are less susceptible to the
scrutinies of our antitrust law.90
Second, the majority opinion places much weight upon its analogy be-
tween the situation of a foreign sovereign in the U.S. marketplace and the
position of the domestic states in U.S. commerce. Justice Stewart reasons
that since the Sherman Act does not include alternative or special remedies
for a foreign sovereign, as it does for the United States,9 then a foreign na-
tion, like a domestic state, would be remediless if the private treble damage
remedy were not available to the foreign sovereign. 92 Such analysis,
however, ignores the basic differences between these two entities.
As noted by the Chief Justice in his dissent, while a foreign sovereign
has the power to enact a wide range of anticompetitive measures which it
can enforce outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, a
domestic state is limited in the scope of its action against the antitrust of-
86. Id. at 595-96.
87. Id. at 596.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 588.
90. See the Chief Justice's dissent, id. at 593.
91. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
92. 98 S. Ct. at 590.
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fender by the parameters established by the commerce" and supremacy"
4
clauses." It should be noted, however, that the states are not preempted
from enacting antitrust legislation of their own, and in fact, all states have
done so to one degree or another."
In addition to the above distinctions, the laws of a foreign country may
legitimately require a broad range of activities which might otherwise be
considered to be in violation of the Sherman Act. A domestic state, on the
other hand, is much more limited in its legal ability to require such activity.
The foreign sovereign's prerogative takes the form of the "act of state doc-
trine" and the "sovereign compulsion defense.""' These defenses to
Sherman Act applications offer wide discretion to the actions of foreign
sovereigns within their own territories vis-a-vis corporations which operate
therein, even when these corporations interact with and have broad an-
ticompetitive effects on the U.S. commerce. The states' ability to avoid
Sherman Act proscriptions directed to corporate activities, on the other
hand, is much more limited. The states' prerogative is encompassed in the
"state action exemption."99 Although the leading case in this area, Parker v.
Brown,'00 implied rather broad discretion to the states, 0 ' subsequent deci-
sions have narrowed the application of the exemption. 102
93. The Commerce Clause. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3, provides that Congress shall have
power: "To regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States and with
the Indian Tribes."
94. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art VI. cl. 2, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound Thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
95. 98 S. Ct. at 595.
96. For a compilation of various state antitrust, see. 4 Trade Reg. Rep- (CCH
1 30,000.00-35,530.10 (1978).
97. The "act of state" doctrine comprises an affirmative defense to Sherman Act viola-
tions which a foreign or domestic corporation may assert to avoid liability for treble damages
or criminal prosecution under the Act. It comprehends a recognition of the "validity of
governmental acts of a foreign sovereign within its own territory," Kitner & Griffin,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. Indus. & Com.
L. Rev. 199, 230 (1977), thereby avoiding the application of the Sherman Act to such "'acts of
state." But see Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. §
2370 (e)(2) (1970).
98. The "sovereign compulsion defense" constitutes a second affirmative defense which a
foreign or domestic corporation may assert to avoid liability under the Sherman Act. Here "im-
munity from suit exists [for the foreign or domestic corporation] where [such] a party's acts are
compelled by regulations of a foreign sovereign." Kitner, note 97 supra. See also Comment, 65
Geo. L.J. 1001 (1977).
99. The "state action exemption" ennunciated a policy in which the Supreme Court
recognized that Congress in enacting the Sherman Act did not intend to infringe upon state's
sovereignty by nullifying a state's legislative control over its officers and agents. Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Thus, the proscriptions of the Sherman Act were viewed as inap-
plicable to the actions of a state acting as sovereign.
100. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
101. Id. at 351.
102. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 46 U.S.L.W. 4246
(1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 759 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975). But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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This distinction between the scope of a state's prerogative and that of a
foreign sovereign becomes more readily apparent in the following example.
If state law is used to compel compliance with the anticompetitive arrange-
ments of private parties, the "state action exemption" will not apply. 03
Whereas, if a foreign sovereign compelled similar compliance, the "act of
state doctrine" and "the sovereign compulsion" defense would sustain the
anticompetitive behavior.0 4 Furthermore, even if the court were to find the
requisite "state action" to avoid application of the Sherman Act, such a
finding would not preclude further commerce and supremacy clause
analysis of the questioned acitivity."°" As already noted, a foreign sovereign
need not undergo such scrutiny.
Third, the majority's opinion implies without explicitly stating,"° 6 a
recogntion of the impact of the recently enacted Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976."°7 This act provides for a number of exceptions to the
jurisdictional immunity from suit in a U.S. court enjoyed by a foreign
state. 10 8 One such exception provides that sovereign immunity shall not ap-
ply in any case:
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act per-
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial ac-
tivity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial ac-
tivity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct ef-
fect in the United States.' 9
103. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
104. Compare Schwegmann, supra note 103 with American Banana Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909) ("act of state" doctrine) and Interamerican Refining Corp., v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) ("sovereign compulsion defense").
105. See Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulations as an Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of
the Parker v. Brown Doctrine 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 61, 98-99 (1974).
106. The Chief Justice's dissent alludes to this effect. See 98 S. Ct. at 593, note 80 supra.
107. 28 U.S.C.A. 1330, 1602-1611 (West 1978).
108. This jurisdictional immunity possessed by a foreign sovereign is encompassed in the
"sovereign immunity" defense. This defense has never served as an absolute bar to all civil suits
against a foreign sovereign in United States courts even prior to the enactment of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act, particularly when the suit involved the commercial activity of the
foreign sovereign. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1970) (plurality
opinion: Justice White Burger, Powell & Rehnquist). See Kintner, supra note 97, at 228-30.
109. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 1978).
With respect to the acts of foreign sovereigns outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere "causing a direct effect in
the United States." The legislative history of the Act indicates that United States may exercise
jurisdiction over these foreign sovereigns consistent with the principles set forth in Restatement
(second) of Foreign Relations Law § 18 (1965). H.R. Rep. No. 17, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976)
reprinted in [19761 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6618. Section 18 of the Restatement
provides in appropriate part that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory,
if .
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct
and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not in-
consistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems.
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Furthermore, the legislative intent of this act indicates that the proscriptions
of the Sherman Act were intended to apply to the commercial activities of
foreign sovereigns.'t0
The effect of the above legislation militates against the dissent's argu-
ment that the Court, in finding a right of action for treble damages for
foreign sovereigns, extended a benefit to a party whose own commercial ac-
tivities need not observe the full constraint of our antitrust laws. Although
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act will generally avoid this result, the
nature of these potential foreign sovereign defendants generates certain fac-
tors which detract from the universal application of our antitrust laws to all
participants in the U.S. marketplace. Those factors include: (1) The need for
personal jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign, and (2) the need for a suf-
ficient nexus between the domestic and foreign commerce of the United
States in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts. '' As a
result, foreign sovereigns still enjoy some measure of immunity from suit in
U.S. courts even when commercial activity is involved. To the extent that
they enjoy this immunity, the result of the majority opinion is to extend a
benefit without requiring comparable adherence to our antitrust laws.
Fourth, the majority's opinion suggests that U.S. recognition of a
foreign state and the existence of peace between the United States and that
country is sufficient criteria to discern which foreign nations should be af-
forded a right of action for treble damages.' 2 However, the treble damage
remedy, by definition, involves the conferring of a remedy that compensates
the victim an amount equal to three times the damages suffered. Conse-
quently, since the remedy affords such an exaggerated benefit, a more sen-
sitive test should be utilized when giving this remedy to foreign nations.
Mere recognition of a foreign sovereign need not imply amicable rela-
tions,1 3 nor need it imply that the United States would care to extend the
benefits of its antitrust laws to such a country.
In sum, the majority's opinion serves to open up the class of plaintiffs
who may seek treble damage relief. Whether the added deterrence achieved
by the broadening of the right of suit is worth the added welfare costs to
American society is a question which remains unanswered.
V. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PFIZER DECISION
Congressional reaction to the Pfizer opinion came swiftly. To date,
three independent bills and two amendments to existing antitrust legislation
have been proposed.
On January 19, 1978, only eight days after the Supreme Court handed
down the Pfizer opinion, Senator Thurmond (R.S.C.), along with five other
110. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 109, at 6618.
111. See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts
and Economic Coercion, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1976).
112. 98 S. Ct. at 591.
113. See, e.g.. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, note 17 supra.
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senators,"' introduced S. 2395.' "The bill provides that the use of the word
"person" in Section 4 of the Clayton Act'1 6 "not include a foreign sovereign
government,"'' 7 thereby precluding treble damage relief to the foreign
sovereign. The bill, however, provides for the placing of the foreign
sovereign government on the same level as the U.S. government. It does so
by amending section 4A of the Clayton Act,"" adding to the right of the
United States to receive single damages, a similar right to single damages by
the foreign sovereign. Senator Thurmond, speaking before the Senate, in-
dicated his rationale for these proposals in stating that, "It appears to me
that it is only fair and that common sense would lead us to treat a foreign
sovereign nation no better or no worse than we treat our own country in
U.S. courts.'' 9 In addition, the Senator pointed to the fact that foreign na-
tions were free to enact their own antitrust laws. He called into question the
Court's majority assertion that by permitting foreign sovereigns to recover
treble damages, these damages, would act as a deterrent to those who would
violate our antitrust laws and benefit U.S. consumers. 20 He concluded by
saying "I have somewhat more difficulty in following the foreign consumer
benefit as one which will help U.S. consumers.""'
Senator De Concini (D. Ariz.), along with co-sponsors, Senators Thur-
mond and Allen, who each have introduced proposals of their own on the
Pfizer case,' 22 introduced S. 2486.23 The bill would amend sections 4 and
4A of the Clayton Act in the same manner proposed by Senator Thur-
mond's bill. Also, it would add an additional prerequisite to an amended
Section 4A of the Clayton Act: that before a foreign sovereign would be en-
titled to sue for single damages, the Attorney General of the United States
would have to certify that: (1) The United States is entitled to sue in its own
name and on a civil claim in the courts of such foreign sovereign; and (2)
such foreign sovereign by its laws prohibits restrictive trade practices.1
2
1
Senator De Concini indicated that his bill was intended to address some of
the "inequities and distortions" created by the Supreme Court's decision in
Pfizer. ,2" Like Senator Thurmond, Senator De Concini quoted Chief Justice
Burger's dissent when introducing his bill citing the anomaly created by af-
fording a right to a foreign sovereign which the U.S. Government itself is
unable to claim in its own courts.2 6 The Senator indicated that in drafting
114. Senators Allen (D. Ala.), Hatch (R. Utah). Helms (R. N.C.). Wallop (R. Wyo.),
Melcher (D. Mont.). Eight additional cosponsors have been added to date: Senators DeConcini
(D. Ariz.), Domenici (D Colo.). Eastland (D. Miss.), Heinz (R. Pa.). Hodges (D. Ark.), Riegle
(D. Mich.). Roth (R_ Del.), Towers (R. Tex.). and Zorinsky (D. Neb.).
115. 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1978).
116. See note 2 supra.
117. S. 2395, note 115 supra.
118. See Act of July 7, 1955, note 52 supra.
119. 124 Cong. Rec. S. 37 (daily ed. January 19, 1978).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See notes 114-15 & 133-34 and accompanying test supra.
123. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
124. Id.
125. 124 Cong. Rec. S. 1190 (daily ed. February 6, 1978).
126. Id-
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his proposal, he had considered making a foreign sovereign's access to U.S.
courts for antitrust relief strictly reciprocal. That is, the access would be
contingent upon the existence of antitrust laws in the foreign country and
the right of the United States to sue under those laws in the foreign
sovereign's courts. But the Senator and his co-sponsors rejected this ap-
proach reasoning that many nations which have antitrust laws do not have a
provision for a private right of action comparable to section 4 of the
Clayton Act. Enforcement in these cases is strictly left to the government.2 7
The Senator went on to note:
The bill is thus based on a general principle of reciprocity. It seeks
to serve broader purposes than simply the compensation of foreign
nations which are victims of anticompetitive practices under our
laws. By its enactment we would demonstrate our intent to en-
courage other nations to recognize the right of the United States to
sue in their courts, thus providing an opportunity for the United
States to vindicate any claims it might have under foreign laws in
the courts of that country. But it would also signal our commit-
ment to encourage other nations to adopt standards of fairness in
the marketplace which are consistent with those reflected in our
antitrust laws.
2
A third independent bill introduced was that of Senator lnouye (D.
Haw.), S. 2724.19 This bill seeks to leave the holding of the Supreme Court
in Pfizer intact, but would amend section 4 of the Clayton Act 3 to require
complete reciprocity before such a foreign sovereign might assert an action
for treble damages in a U.S. court.' 3' The Senator reasons that in an in-
creasingly competitive world in which the United States is losing its ability
to effect its economic objectives and policies, foreign nations and firms will
gleefully take advantage of our unwillingness to close the loopholes in our
antitrust laws and policies, which are oblivious to the conditions of the real
world and that permit foreign firms to neatly circumvent the force of our
laws.' 32
127. Id.
128. Id. at S. 1191.
The Senator rather eloquently pointed out:
Let me add, Mr. President, that the purpose of this bill is not to penalize any nation.
Each country remains free to accept or reject anticompetitive trade practices. But the
United States ought to utilize its own courts to promote healthy competition and not
to reward nations which, on the one hand, allow and sometimes encourage
monopoly and price-fixing but, on the other, demand to sue when they are the vic-
tims of such practices. Justice requires that those nations who do make an honest ef-
fort should be afforded the same consideration under the same circumstances as the
United States. Those which do not, however, should be excluded from suing under
Section 4 of the Sherman Act.
129. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
.130. See note 2 supra.
131. The bill calls for amending Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1977). by
adding the following sentence at the conclusion of the section: "A foreign sovereign govern-
ment, including any agency or agent thereof, may sue for any injury pursuant to this section if
United States persons and the United States government are permitted equivalent access and
relief for the same injury in the courts of such foreign government."
132. 124 Cong. Rec. S. 3461 (daily ed. March 10, 1978).
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Senator Allen (D. Ala.) introduced an amendment"' to S. 1874.34 The
amendment is comparable to Senator Thurmond's proposal, a5 which
Senator Allen had already co-sponsored.
The final proposal is that of Congressman Wiggins (R. Calif.). The
Congressman introduced his amendment to an existing antitrust bill, H.R.
8359, 136 before the House Judiciary's Subcommittee on Monopolies and
Commercial Law. The proposal calls for amending Section 4 of the Clayton
Act' to exclude specifically foreign sovereigns from the right to sue for tre-
ble damages. 38 This proposed amendment has recently passed the Subcom-
mittee and will be reported to the Judiciary Committee for action before it
goes to the entire House. It is questionable, however, whether this amend-
ment will survive the scrutiny of the full Committee at this time, since many
of the Subcommittee's members were not present when the Wiggins amend-
ment passed and since no hearings were held on the merits of the proposed
amendment prior to its adoption by the Subcommittee.
Of all of the above proposals, Senator De Concini's would seem to have
the most beneficial effect. First, it allows a foreign sovereign a right to single
damages only. The single damage remedy for an entity which possesses
power comparable to that of the United States when within its own territory
is appropriate: it provides a true measure of the actual injury suffered.
Further, it helps limit the degree to which a defendant might be subject to
multiple liability in the event a foreign sovereign decided to sue or prosecute
a defendant under both U.S. law and its own antitrust laws. 3 9 The incentive
to prosecute a claim afforded by the treble damage remedy would not seem
to be adversely affected by limiting the remedy to only single damages since
government contracts, whether foreign or domestic, tend to be larger than
the ordinary corporate contract and this size alone provides an incentive, in
and of itself, to seek redress of grievances. Second, the added requirement
that the U.S. Attorney General certify a foreign state before allowing such a
state to sue in U.S. courts under antitrust law'4 0 provides, as Senator De
Concini has indicated, an opportunity for the United States to vindicate any
claims it has under foreign law while at the same time encouraging other na-
tions to adopt antitrust measures similar to our own."'
The Thurmond and the Allen proposals fall short of the above proposal
since they do not require certification by the Attorney General and thus do
133. Amend. No. 1669, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1978). Senator Allen died on June I, 1978.
134. S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), is a bill proposed by Senator Kennedy (D.
Mass.) to counteract the effect of another recent Supreme Court decision, Illinois Brick v. Il-
linois, see note 72 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
136. H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1977), is the House version of S. 1874 which deals
with the Illinois Brick v. Illinois decision of the Supreme Court. See notes 134 & 72 supra.
137. See note 2 supra.
138. The Congressman's proposal would amend Section 4 of the Clayton Act by adding
the following to the last sentence of the section: "provided however that this section shall not
authorize suits by a foreign sovereign government, a department, or agency thereof,"
139. Cf Illinois Brick v. Illinois, note 72 supra.
140. See text accompaning note 124 supra.
141. See text accompaning note 128 supra.
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not achieve the added benefits discussed above. The Inouye proposal seems
to afford little or no right of actions for damages, since it requires complete
reciprocity. Such a requirement fails to take account of the varied nature of
antitrust laws enacted by many foreign states, measures which are effective
and display similar concerns as our own antitrust laws, although they might
not afford a treble damage remedy. 42 Finally, Congressman Wiggin's
proposal denying any right of action to a foreign sovereign does not achieve
the benefits that the granting of a limited right of action might achieve by
helping shape foreign nations' commercial behavior vis-6-vis the United
States.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pfizer represents a substantial broadening of the plaintiff class entitled
to sue for treble damages. Whether the Court's decision will result in a large
influx of suits by foreign sovereigns may become manifest in the near future.
However, given the Congressional concern generated by the Court's opi-
nion,'4 3 the holding of the Court may be short lived. The Pfizer Court's con-
cern for fulfilling the treble damage remedy's twin purpose of maximizing
deterrence and providing compensation, might better be served by the
extension of a right to single damages premised upon a prerequisite certifi-
cation by the Attorney General that the foreign sovereign seeking relief
permits the United States to sue in its courts and prohibits unfair trade
practices.
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142. See Senator De Concini's remarks before the Senate upon the introduction of his bill
in the Congressional Record, note 125 supra,
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